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CRIMINAL PnoCEDuRE-STANDING OF THB PREss TO PnoTEST Juoon's Ex-
CLUSION OF THB Ptmuc FROM CRIMINAL TRIAL-Plaintiff newspapers sent 
reporters to the trial of Minot Jelke. Defendant judge, exercising his discretion, 
excluded them as well as the general public from the courtroom when testimony 
dealing with the sordid details of prostitution and pandering was expected. The 
family and friends of the accused, along with the officers of the court, witnesses 
and jury were not excluded. Plaintiffs applied to the Supreme Court, Special 
Term, of New York County for a writ of prohibition to restrain the defendant 
from enforcing his order. The application for the writ was based on a statute 
guaranteeing the accused in a criminal trial the right to a public trial.1 This 
mandatory right2 is qualified by another statute listing specific exceptions to the 
right of public trial in the interest of protecting public morals and decency.3 
The application was denied on the grounds that the defendant had the power to 
issue the exclusion order and that the Supreme Court, Special Term, could not 
substitute its judgment for that of the defendant.4 On appeal, held, affirmed. 
The guarantee of a public trial is personal to the parties to the trial and is not a 
right of the public. While the public has an interest in a public trial, it is up 
to the accused to assert or waive that right, and outsiders have no standing to 
raise it.5 No question of freedom of speech or of the press is involved because 
these rights do not allow the press access to places not open to the general public 
as well. United Press Association v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E. (2d) 777 
(1954). 
1 66 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) §8. 
2People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931). 
3 29 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) §4. The cases in which the trial judge can 
exclude the public from the courtroom include rape, adultery, sodomy, and similar sexual 
crimes. The case of People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. (2d) 769 (1954), decided 
the same day as the principal case, held that the statute did not apply. Although evidence 
of sodomy was to be introduced, the crime charged was not one of the listed crimes. 
4 United Press Association v. Valente, 203 Misc. 220, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 642 (1953); 
281 App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1953). These two decisions were noted in 52 
MICm:. L. RP.v. 609 (1954). 
5 It is said that a contrary holding would take control of the courtroom away from the 
judge. State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S.W. 257 (1887); 15 Umv. Pn-r. L. REv. 385 
(1954). This view apparently is based on an unflatteringly low opinion of the trial judge's 
capability. 49 CoL. L. RP.v. 110 (1949). 
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The right of the press as a member of the public to protest its exclusion from 
a criminal trial does not seem to have been litigated before. This is explainable 
on two grounds: (I) when an exclusionary order is given, the press is. not 
normally included in the order;6 and (2) litigating the exclusion order is both 
costly and time consuming~· while the news value of the trial is low at the time 
the issue is finally decided. To maintain a statutory cause of action, a person 
must show that he is a member of the class for whose interest or protection the 
statute was enacted. Ever since Cooley stated that the right to a public trial 
found in various state constitutions and statutes was for the benefit of the ac-
cused and not the public,7 courts have piled up reams of dicta to that effect.8 
Cooley apparently based his statement on history for he cited no cases deciding 
the question. The prestige of Cooley's name, combined with the passage of 
time, have given such weight to this view that its reversal is unlikely. How-
ever, it is not obvious that Cooley's interpretation of history is correct. Bentham 
saw the public trial as a public right intended to insure the proper administra-
tion of justice, 9 and the English cases treat the right as one belonging to both 
the defendant and the public.10 If, as has been stated,11 the public trial right 
resulted from a distaste for such abuses of judical power as Star Chamber, the 
Spanish Inquisition, and the French lettres de cachet, regard for the defendant 
was not the reason for the insertion of the requirement in so many constitutions. 
The real basis for the right lay in the fear of the judiciary becoming a means to 
tyranny and despotism, and publicity was believed to be the answer to the evil.12 
Some courts have used this historical background to define the word "public" 
as meaning the opposite of in camera,13 so that if any disinterested party is 
present at the trial it is said to be a public trial. However, this definition takes 
only half the reason for the right. Other courts interpret the word "public'' to 
mean a trial to which members of the public have freedom of access.14 These 
courts accept Cooley's statements at face value and deny that there is any right 
in the public to attend the trial. Along with the historical argument, the courts 
6 The fact that the press was allowed to remain in court to observe the trial after the 
exclusionary order is emphasized in many cases dealing with the question of whether the 
defendant actually had a public trial. State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 
(1906); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916); Sullivan, "The Public 
Interest in Public Trial,'' 25 PA. B.Q. 253 (1954). 
7 CooLEY, CoNSnTIInONAL UMITATIONS, 8th ed., 647 (1927). 
8 State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P. (2d) 1110 (1936); People v. Hartman, 103 
Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894); 52 MICH. L. REv. 128 (1953). 
9 BENTHAM, RATIONALE 01' JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827). 
10 Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B. and C. 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (1829). 
11 See Justice Black's opinion in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948). 
12 Jn re Oliver, note 11 supra; 67 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1953). 
13State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142,217 P. 705 (1923); United States v. Kobli, (3d 
Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 919; Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 P. 273 (1918). 
14 State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212 (1844); Carter v. State, 99 Miss. 435, 54 S. 734 
(1911). 
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raise a questionable fear for public morals as a makeweight for their decisions.15 
Query if this is not censorship by a few and, in reality, a poor reason for ex-
clusion of the public. Realizing that there is no reason to overcrowd a court-
room, and that there are cases where the possible embarrassment to a witness 
would call for a limitation of the number of gaping sensation seekers, the public 
and its press representatives still have a legitimate interest in attending trials. 
This interest has been denied on the authority of Cooley's name, history, and 
"protection of public morals," without a close, critical appraisal of the rationale 
of exclusion. Publicizing a trial is vital to both the defendant and the public, 
especially in the criminal trial, and when a representative of the public asserts 
that right it should not be denied solely on the ground that it is not the proper 
party in interest. 
M. Fred Mallender, II, S.Ed. 
ll>Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 S. 101 (1921); Reagan v. United States, (9th Cir. 
1913) 202 F. 488. See 6 WIGMORI!, EvmBNCE, 3d ed., §1835 (1940), for exclusionary 
statutes and decisions based on injury to public morals. 
